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VOHRA COMMITTEE REPORT
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
l. l Government had (through its Order No.S/7937/SS(ISP)/93 dated 9th
July ‘93) established a Committee, comprised as below, to take stock of
all available information about the activities of crime Syndicates/Mafia
organisations which had developed links with and were being protected by
Government functionaries and political personalities. Based on the
recommendations of the Committee, Government shall determine the need, if
any, to establish a special organisation/agency to regularly collect
information and pursue cases against such elements:
(i) Home Secretary Chairman
(ii) Secretary (R) Member
(iii) DIB Member
(iv) Director CBI Member
(v) JS(PP) MHA Member Secy.
1.2 The Committee was authorised to invite senior officers of various
concerned Departments to gather the required information.
1.3 Special Secretary (Internal Security & Police), MHA, was
subsequently added as a Member of the Committee. The Committee was desired
to submit its Report within 3 months.
2.1 In the first meeting of the Committee (held on l5th July ‘93), I
had explained to the Members that Government had established the Committee
after seeing the reports of our Intelligence and Investigation agencies on
the activities/linkages of the Dawood Ibrahim gang, consequent to the bomb
blasts in Bombay in March 1993. From these various reports, it was
apparent that the activities of Memon Brothers and Dawood Ibrahim had
progressed over the years, leading to the establishment of a powerful
network. This could not have happened without these elements having been
protected by the functionaries of the concerned Government departments,
specially Customs, Income Tax, Police and others. It was, therefore,
necessary to identify the linkages and to also determine how such
information could be timely collected and acted upon in the future.
2.2 In the course of the discussions, I perceived that some of the
Members appeared to have some hesitation in openly expressing their views
and also seemed unconvinced that Government actually intended to pursue
such matters. Accordingly, I addressed separate personal letters to each
of the Mernbers of the Committee seeking their well considered suggestions
and recommendations. Their responses are briefly brought out below.
2.3 The various offices abroad of this Agency have limited strength and
are largely geared to the collection of military, economic, scientific and
political intelligence. R&AW monitor the activities of certain
organisations abroad only insofar as they relate to their involvement with
narco-rerrorist elements and smuggling arms, ammunition, explosives, etc.
into the country. It does not monitor the activities of criminal elements
abroad, which are mainly confined to "normal smuggling without any
links to terrorist elements". The present strength of the Agency’s
offices abroad would not permit it to enlarge its field of activities. If,
however, there is evidence to suggest that these organisations have links
with Intelligence agencies of other countries, particularly Pakistan, and
that they are being used or are likely to be used by such countries for
destabilising our economy, it would become R&AW’s responsibility to
monitor their activities, as is being done by this Agency to collect vital
information in regard to the investigations in the Bombay bomb blasts
2.4 The creation of a nodal agency to collect information regarding the
activities of Mafia organisations is very essential. All the existing
information/data available with R&AW, IB and CBI could be made
available to this nodal agency. R&AW will nominate an officer of
suitable rank to Iiaise with the nodal agency on a
regular basis to enable expeditious follow-up action.
3. l A Report on the nexus between the Bombay City Police and the
Bombay under-world was prepared by CBI in 1986. It would be useful to
institute a fresh study by CBI, on the basis of which appropriate
administrative/ legal measures could be initiated.
3.2 An organised crime Syndicate/Mafia generally commences its
activities by indulging in petty crime at the local level, mostly relating
to illicit distillation/gambling/organised satta and prostitution in the
larger towns. In port towns, their activities involve smuggling and sale
of imported goods and progressively graduate
to narcotics and drug trafficking. In the bigger cities, the main source
of income relates to real estate - forcibly occupying lands/buildings,
procuring such properties at cheap rates by forcing out the existing
occupants/tenants etc. Over time, the money power thus acquired is used
for building up contacts with bureaucrats and politicians and expansion of
activities with impunity. The
money power is used to develop a network of muscle-power which is also
used by the politicians during elections.
3.3 CBI has reported that all over India crime Syndicates have become a
law unto themselves. Even in the smaller towns and rural areas, muscle-men
have become the order of the day. Hired assassins have become a part of
these organisations. The nexus between the criminal gangs, police,
bureaucracy and politicians has come out clearly in various parts of the
country. The existing criminal justice system, which was essentially
designed to deal with the individual offences/crimes, is unable to deal
with the activities of the Mafia; the provisions of law in regard economic
offences are weak; there are insurmountable legal difficulties in
attaching/confiscation of the property acquired through Mafia activities.
3.4 It has been suggested that the menace has first to be tackled at
the local level where the agencies of the State and the concerned Central
Enforcement Agencies like Customs and Excise, Income Tax etc. would be
required to take effective action. In cases where a crime Syndicate has
graduated to big business, it would be necessary to conduct detailed
investigations into its assets, both movable and immovable. It has been
stressed that when such action is not timely and effectively taken, the
lower functionaries of the concerned State and Central Departments/organisations
start over-looking the activities of the crime Syndicates. To elucidate
this point, the Director CBI has given the example of IQBAL MIRCHI of
Bombay who, till the late 80’s, was
merely a visitor to passenger and carrier ships to obtain liquor and
cigarettes for selling the same at a profit. In the last 3-4 years, MIRCHI
acquired real estate valuing crores of rupees; he has many bank accounts
and has been paying lakhs of rupees to his carriers. The growth of MIRCHI
is due to the fact that the concerned Enforcement agencies did not timely
take action against him and, later, this perhaps became difficult on
account of the enormous patronage that he had developed. If MIRCHI is
investigated, the entire patronage enjoyed by him and his linkages will
come to light. Director CBI has observed that there are many such cases,
as that of MIRCHI where the initial failure has led to the emergence of
Mafia giants who have become too big to be tackled.
3.5 Director CBI has stated that the main mode of
communications/contacts of the Mafias operating at the international level
is through telephonic communications. Referring to the useful leads
emerging from the investigations into the activities of Dawood Ibrahim, a
Mafia leader, the director CBI has stated that the effective monitoring of
the telephone calls made from India/received from abroad would yield
useful information and, for this being done, Government may grant sanction
to monitor certain telephone connections.
3.6 The assistance of Banks is an essential input. The Bank Managers
can be placed under obligation to render reports on all heavy transactions
and suspicious accounts to the Enforcement agencies. Such a practice
obtains in UK.
3.7 Concluding his analysis, Director CBI has made the following
suggestions to bring under control the activities of the criminal
(i) Identification of offences and award of deterrent punishments,
including preventive detention.
(ii) Trial procedures should be simplified and hastened.
(iii) Surveillance should be carried out through finger printing,
photographs and dossiers.
(iv) Monitoring mechanisms should be established at the State and
(v) Establishment of Special Cells in the States CIDs and CBI.
(vi) Suitable amendments should be introduced in the existing laws
to more effectively deal with the activities of Maixa organisations,
etc.; this would also include review of the existing laws.
(vii) A detailed case study of l0-15 cases would provide useful
information regarding the administrative/legal measures, which would
be required to be taken to effectively tackle the functioning of Mafia
organizations. The CBI can do this within a short period.
6.1 DIB has reported that due to the progressive decline in the values
of public life in the country "warning signals of sinister linkage
between thc underworld politicians and the bureaucracy have been evident
with disturbing regularity, as exemplified by the exposures of the
networks of the Bombay blast case". He has
recommended itnmediate attention to:-
(i) Identification of the nexus between the criminals/Mafias and
anti-national elements on the one hand and bureaucrats, politicians
and other sensitively located individuals on the other.
(ii) Identification of the nature and dimensions of these linkages
and the modus operandi of their operations.
(iii) Assessment of the
impact of these linkages on the various institutions, viz., the
electoral, political, economic, law and order and the administrative
(iv) Nexus, if any, between the domestic linkages with foreign
(v) Necessary action to show effective action to counteract/
neutralise the Mafia activities.
(vi) Political and legal constraints in dealing with the
covert/illegal functioning of the linkages.
6.2 Like the Director CBI, the DIB has also stated that
has been a rapid spread and growth of criminal gangs, armed senas, drug
Mafias, smuggling gangs, drug peddlers and economic lobbies in the country
which have, over the years, developed an extensive network of contacts
with the bureaucrats/Government functionaries at the local levels,
politicians, media persons and strategically located individuals in the
non-State sector. Some of these Syndicates also have international
linkages, including the foreign intelligence agencies.
In this context, the DIB has given the following examples
(i) In certain States, like Bihar, Haryana and UP, these gangs
enjoy the patronage of local level politicians, cutting across party
lines and the protection of governmental functionaries. Some political
leaders become the leaders of these gangs/armed senas and, over the
years, get themselves elected to local bodies, State Assemblies and
the national Parliament. Resultantly, such elements have acquired
considerable political clout seriously jeopardizing the smooth
functioning of the administration and the safety of life and property
of the common man, causing a sense of despair and alienation among the
(ii) The big smuggling Syndicates, having international linkages,
have spread into and infected the various economic and financial
activities, including havala transactions, circulation of black money
and operations of a vicious parallel economy causing serious damage to
the economic fibre of the country. These Syndicates have acquired
substantial financial and muscle power and social respectability and
have successfully corrupted the government machinery at all levels and
wield enough influence to make the task of Investigating and
Prosecuting agencies extremely difficult; even the members of the
Judicial system have not escaped the embrace of the Mafia.
(iii) Certain elements of the Mafia have shifted to narcotics,
drugs and weapon smuggling and established narco-terrorism networks,
specially in the States of J&K, Punjab, Gujarat and Maharashtra. The
cost of contesting elections has thrown the politician into the lap of
these elements and led to a grave compromise by officials of the
preventive/detective systems. The virus has
spread to almost all the centres in the country; the coastal and the
border States have been particularly affected.
(iv) The Bombay bomb blast case and the communal, riots in Surat
and Ahmedabad have demonstrated how the Indian underworld has been
exploited by the Pak ISI and the latter’s network in UAE to cause
sabotage, subversion and communal tension in various parts of the
country. The investigations into the Bombay bomb blast cases have
revealed extensive linkages of the underworld in the various
governmental agencies, political circles, business sector and the film
6.3 DIB has stated that the network of
the Mafia is virtually running a parallel Government,
pushing the State apparatus into irrelevance. It is thus most immediately
necessary that an institution is established to effectively deal with the
menace. In this connection, the DIB has stated:
(i) Presently, there. is no system/ mechanism which is
specifically designated to collect and collate intelligence pertaining
to the linkages developed by crime Syndicates/Mafias with the
governmental set up. Nonetheless, the various
intelligence/investigation/enforcement agencies collect, in the normal
course of their functioning, information about the nexus between the
bureaucracy and politicians with the Mafia gangs, smugglers and the underworld.
These agencies use such available inputs "only within the narrow
confines of their work charter and choose not to take undue cognisance
and follow-up action, leave alone sharing with any other agencies".
Thus, all these agencies "function within their own cocoons, with
the result that a plethora of information fails to get specific and purposeful
attention needed for the exposure of the Linkages". It is, therefore,
necessary to immediately have an institutionalized system which
"while giving total freedom to the various agencies to pursue
their charter of work, would simultaneously cast on them the onus
of sharing such inputs to a nodal outfit whose job will be to
process this information for attention of a single designated
authority". This will enable the nodal Group to
provide useful leads to the various agencies and, over time, a
progressive database will get generated "to facilitate periodic reviews
and analysis which could then be passed to a designated body".
7.1 As would be seen from the afore-stated brief discussion, specially
the views expressed by Director CBI and DIB, it is evident that the muscle
power of the crime Syndicates is sustained by their enormous financial
power which, in turn, is, secured by the Mafia elements by committing
economic offences with impunity. In this context, I held detailed personal
discussions with Secretary (Revenue) under whose control operate the
various economic intelligence/investigative/enforcement agencies.
7.2 The Department of Revenue functions through the following major
(i) Central Board of Excise & Customs
Inter alia, CBSE is responsible for the prevention of smuggling, In
this and other tasks, it is assisted by the by the Director General of
Revenue Intelligence (DGRI) and the Directorate General of Anti-Evasion (DGAE).
The DGRI deals with the evasion of customs duties; the DGAE with Excise
(ii) Central Board of Direct Taxes
Income Tax Department administers the Income Tax Act, Wealth Tax Act,
(iii) Central Economic Intelligence Bureau
The CEIB is responsible for coordinating and strengthening the
intelligence gathering activities and the investigative and enforcement
actions of the various agencies responsible for investigation into
economic offences and the enforcement of economic laws. The CEIB is
responsible for maintaining liaison with the concemed Departments
Directorates both at the Centre and at the State levels and is expected to
provide overall direction to the investigative agencies under the
Department of Revenue.
The CEIB is expected, inter alia, to attend to the following tasks:
(a) Identification of major sources generating black money;
directing and developing intelligence about such sources; planning and
coordinating action and operations against such sources.
(b) Assisting the various enforcement agencies in strengthening the
intelligence gathering infrastructure and building up their
capability for storage and retrieval of intelligence.
(c) Conducting investigative and analytical studies in difficult
areas of black money operations and monitoring indicators thereof.
(iv) Enforcement Directorate
This Directorate is concerned with the enforcement of the investigation
and penal provision of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act; collection of
intelligence relating to foreign exchange offences; enquiries into
suspected violations of the provisions of FERA, etc.
(v) Narcotics Control Bureau
The NCB is responsible for the administration of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act. It is responsible for coordination with
different Central and State Government Departments/Ministries and the
various Central and State law enforcement agencies for the implementation
of the NDPS Act. I explained to Secretary (Revenue) the broad
considerations on account of which the government had set up a Committee
to look into the linkages developed by the Mafia elements. He informed me
that he had recently held a meeting with senior representatives of the
RBI, the Chairman CBEC, Chairman CBDT and the Economic Intelligence
Council in the Department of Revenue, and readily agreed with my request
to attend a meeting of the Committee along with his concerned officers for
a full discussion on the issues before the Committee. Accordingly, I
arranged a meeting of the Committee (30th Aug ‘93) to hear the views of
Seeretary (Revenue), who was accompanied by chairman CBDT, DGRI, Member
(Customs) and Director (Enforcement). During the course of the discussions
with Secretary (Revenue) and his aforesaid principal officers, the
following significant observations were made:
(i) In the normal course of
his work, to detect violations of Customs & Excise laws, the
DGRI comes across information on linkages crime Syndicates and
governmental functionaries etc. As following
of such information is not within the charter of duties of DGRI,
his officers focus primarily on the information relating to the
violation of laws relating to their charter.
(ii) As in the case of DGRT, indirect
information also becomes available the CBDT about linkages.
Here again, not being directly relating to their charter of
responsibilities, the CBDT do not follow up such leads.
(iii) While the NCB is specifically responsible for booking drug
traffickers, with the increasing importance being given to Narco-terrorism,
the NCB has been asked to gather further information so that the
real king-pins in the narcotics trade can be apprehended.
(iv) The Directorate of’ Enforcement comes across information on
linkages and passes it on to the CBI and IB.
(v) Of late, currency
amounting to crores of rupees is being seized, invariably packed
in suitcases and gunny bags. The Banks are reluctant to pass on
informaton about account holders to CBDT and do not allow their
officers to hold exploratory enquiries.
(vi) While a certain arnount of information is shared between the
various organisations under the Department of Revenue, and those
under the MHA and Cabinet Secretariat, the exchanges are sporadic
and limited. This is perhaps due to the fact that each concerned
organisation/agency is anxious to protect its sources and is
apprehensive that a full sharing of all information might
jeopardise its operations, on account of premature leakage of
(vii) While DGRI, Director (Enforcement) and DG NCB are authorised to
undertake phone tapping of suspected offenders, the DGRI has not been allowed
to enforce surveillance on the telephonic communications of political
(viii) Senior Police officers, even in the border States, are not
trained or adequately informed of the work done by the Directorate of
Enforcement, specially in regard to money laundering operations.
(ix) Information about the activities of drug traffickers is passed
on by DG NCB to the concerned State Governments and their agencies.
However, niggardly responses by the latter and prolonged
delays in the disposal of cases before the Courts seriously
hampers. the effective functioning of the NCB. While the NDPS Act
prescribes the award of deterrent punishments to offenders, the
results are to the contrary. It is necessary that
the Directorates of Prosecution in the State Governments are urgently brought
under the control of the State Police.
7.5 Secretary (Revenue) stated that the field officers of his various
Departments were faced with various problems, amongst which are:
(i) The utter
inadequacy of the criminal justice system;
cases are not heard timely; functioning of the Government
lawyers is grossly inadequate; all this results in a low
percentage of convictions and mild punishments. Unless the
criminal justice system is geared up, the work of the enforcement
agencies cannot be effective.
(ii) The field officers of the various agencies of the
Revenue Department are often pressurized by senior government
functionaries/political leaders, apparently at the behest of
crime Syndicates/Mafia elements. Unless the field level officers
are offered effective protection, they cannot be expected
to maintain interest in vigorously pursuing action against the activities
of such elements.
7.6 Chairman CBDT stated that insofar as the functioning of his
officers is concerned, whenever they come into possession of any
information regarding the violation of any other law, they pass it on to
the concerned agency. He suggested that if the information available with
other agencies is passed on to him, his officers could pursue the sane.
8.l As a result of the discussions held by the Committee with Secretary
(Reveriue) and his principal officers, it is evident that:
(i) While, in the course of their normal activities,
information on the linkages of the crime Syndicates
sometimes becomes available, such information is not
pursued on the score that it is not directly related to offences
falling within the laws administered by these agencies;
(ii) such information is occasionally passed on by these
agencies to the CBI and or IB;
(iii) the various agencies under the Department of Revenue do
not specifically search out information on the linkages of
9. 1 Consequent to the Committee’s discussions with the Secretary
(Revenue) and his principal officers, I held a series of further personal
discussions with the Secretary (Revenue). At my request, Secretary
(Revenue) gave me a personal note indicating his views, which are briefly
(i) The information gathered by the various agencies under the
Revenue Department, while gathering intelligence on offences relating
to the laws administered by them, is generally not put to any use
unless it is required to be passed on to other intelligence agencies
outside the Department of Revenue.
(ii) The linkages
developed by crime Syndicates get generally confirmed when pressure is
mounted on the concerned agencies not to take action against the
offenders or to go slow in the cases against them. Such pressures are
mounted either immediately after a raid is conducted or at the time
when prosecution is about to be initiated. Pressures
are also exerted whenever corrupt and undesirable officers are shifted
from sensitive assignments (Preventive
Customs Divisions at the Airports, sensitive Collectorates in the
Central Excise etc.).
(iii) In the narcotics arena, which includes cultivation of opium,
manufacture of alkaloids, prevention of narcotics, smuggling etc. the
financial stakes are astronomically high. Consequently, the level of
corruption is of a very high order in this area of functioning and
enormous pressures are brought to bear even when subordinate officials
are posted away specially when the shift of an officer adversely
affects the interests of those who are making easy money.
(iv) Narcotics trade has a
world-wide network of smugglers who also have close links with
terrorists. Terrorists indulge in narcotics trade to amass huge funds,
in various foreign currencies, from which they source their
procurement of weapons etc.
9.2 While the Department of Revenue has initiated a number of steps to
deal with the activities of smugglers and to plug loop-holes in the
system, Secretary (Revenue) has stated that a possible approach to
effectively liquidating the linkages developed by the crime Syndicates
would be to mercilessly prosecute the offenders without succumbing to any
pressure whatsoever. He is of the view that once the offenders are
deterrently punished under the law, their influence and strength will
start declining, as also of all those who support them, wherever located.
He has emphasised that for this objective being achieved it will be
extremely necessary that: the entire governmental machinery involved in
taking action against the crime Syndicates is allowed to perform its
duties with total freedom; officers with impeccable integrity should be
posted to head the various organisations which are responsible for taking
action against tax offenders, smugglers etc; such officers should be
selected with utmost care and provided sufficiently long tenures, giving
them the clear mandate to ruthlessly punish the offenders; action must be
taken to ensure the objective functioning of Courts which deal with the
trial of economic offences; all cases before the Courts should be speedily
concluded without the judicial officers coming under any pressure or
succumbing to temptations; inefficient and corrupt elements in the various
organisations venue must be weeded out and Government should take
stringent action against officers who seek to exert political pressure for
securing postings and appointments of their choice.
10.1 From the above narrated analysis, the following conclusions can be
(i) On the basis of the extensive experience gained by our various
concerned intelligence, investigative and enforcement agencies,
it is apparent that crime
Syndicates and Mafia organisations have established themselves in various
parts of the country.
(ii) The various crime
Syndicates /Mafia organisations have developed significant muscle and
money power and established linkages with governmental functionaries,
political leaders and others to be able to operate with impunity (as
recently exemplified by the activities of the Memon Brothers and Dawood
(iii) While the CBI and IB and the various agencies under the
Department of Revenue, in their normal course of functioning, come
across information relating to the linkages of crime
Syndicates/Mafia organisations, there is presently no system under which
they are expected to pass on such information to an indentified
nodal agency. Sharing of such information is presently of an
occasional nature and no evidence is available of the same having
been put to any operational use (the only mentionable exception
perhaps relates to the recent investigations into the activities of
Memon Brothers and the Dawood gang on which several of our agencies
were put to work collectively).
11.1 Even where an agency comes across certam information about the
linkages of crime Syndicates, it has no mandate to immediately pass it on
to one or more agencies. An agency which comes across information
regarding linkages is also apprehensive that the sharing of such
information may jeopardize its own functioning through premature leakage.
In sum, the various agencies presently in the field take care to
essentially focus on their respective charter of duties, dealing with the
infringement of laws relating to their organisations and consciously
putting aside any information on linkages which they may come across.
12. 1 In the discussions in lhe Committee, I asked each of the Members
as well as the Secretary (Revenue) and his principal officers about their
views regarding the establishment of a Nodal Agency for the collection,
collation and operationalisation of all information relating to the
activities of crime Syndicates. Broadly, the following approaches have
(i) The DIB has stated that while considering the establishment of
any nodal mechanism, "It must be appreciated that the problems
has enormous impact on national security and is indeed highly
political in nature". In this context, he has suggested that the
nodal set up should be under the IB, which is even otherwise engaged
in monitoring various political activities having a bearing on
national security. He has recommended that "an exclusive Top
Secret Cell be established in the IB to function as the Nodal Group
for receipt of inputs from various security/revenue agencies which
reveal a politician-bureaucrat-underworld nexus. Such sharing will be
through personal communications in writing, while operating
difficulties could be sorted out through periodic meetings among the
heads of these organisations to be chaired by the Home
Secretary". The Top Secret Cel1 will share all tactical and
operational information with other concerned agencies on "need to
know and act basis".
(ii) The other approach recommended is to set up a system under
which the Heads of the various Intelligence and Revenue agencies shall
meet on a regular basis and exchange vital information, without there
being any leakage.
13.1 In the background of the discussions so far, there does not appear
to be need for any further debate on the
vital importance of setting up a nodal point to
which all existing intelligence and Enforcement agencies (irrespective of
the Department under which they are located ) shall promptly pass on any
information which they may come across, which relates to the activities of
13.2 If the preposition in the preceding para is sustained, a decision
will need to be taken regarding the Department/Ministry under which the
nodal set-up should be located.
14.1 Under the existing arrangements for the transaction of Government
business, the Ministry of Home Affairs is responsible for all matters
relating to internal security. It is for this reason that the Intelligence
Bureau is a part and parcel of this Ministry (It is only by tradition that
the DIB reports directly to authorities
outside MHA). R&AW functions under the Cabinet Secretariat and
deals with external intelligence. The various Intelligence, Investigation
and Enforcement agencies dealing with the implementation of economic laws
report to the Revenue Department under the Ministry of Finance. The CBI,
which is the principal criminal investigation agency of the Centre, is
under the Department of Personnel.
14.2 In my view, considerable care would have to be taken to ensure
that the information which becomes available to the Nodal Cell is handled
by a very senior and trust-worthy officer. Any leakage of such information
would not only jeopardize potential action against the powerful criminal
Syndicates, but may also be susceptible to political exploitation. Under
all circumstances, it will have to be ensured that the information
available with the nodal set-up is used strictly and entirely for
stringent action against the crime Syndicates, without allowing any scope
whatever of its being exploited for political gain.
14.3 In the preceding context, it would be logical if the nodal set-up
is under the MHA, directly handled by the Home Secretary who can be
assisted by one or more selected officers of the Ministry for the
collation and compilation of all information received from IB, CBI,
R&AW and the various agencies under the Department of Revenue The
manner in which such information is operationalised would need to be
confidentially discussed with the concerned Heads of Organisation and, as
necessary, with Secretary (Revenue). It will also need to be ensured that
the nodal set-up functions with extreme secrecy. Needless to say, any
leakage whatever about the linkages of crime Syndicate senior Government
functionaries or political leaders in the states or at the centre could
have a destabilizing effect on the functioning of Government. As
such, it would not appear prudent to entrust the functioning of the Nodal
Cell to any level below that of the Home Secretary. Further, the
government would also have to carefully consider and prescribe the
authorities to whom the Home Secretary will report in regard to the
sensitive information received by the nodal set-up as well as regarding
the operations to be launched by one or more of the concerned agencies to
apprehend, investigate and prosecute the offenders.
15.1 In the normal course this report would have been drafted by the
Mernber Secretary and finalized by the Committee. Considering the nature
of the issues involved, I did not consider it desirable to burden the
Members of the Committee with any further involvement beyond the views
expressed by them. Accordingly, I decided to personally dictate this
15.2 I have prepared only three copies of this Report. One copy each is
being submitted to MOS(IS) and HM, the third copy being retained by rne.
After HM has perused this Report, I request him to consider discussing
further action with finance Minister, MOS(IS) and myself. The emerging
approach could thereafter be got approved from Prime Minister before being
implemented. At that stage other concerned senior officers would be taken
15.3 After an initial discussion at the level of MOS(IS) and HM I could
send a copy of this Report to FM, before the issues are discussed with
(N. N. VOHRA )
HM [Copy No.1/3]
MOS [Copy No.2/3]